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Abstract 
Global research and development (R&D) data on pharmaceutical drugs from 1980 to 2012 are used to 
estimate the risk of attrition of a project in each R&D stage as a function of the duration of each stage, 
and competition and alliances between firms. We find that markets with more new drugs and less R&D 
competitors experience higher attrition. These effects are particularly important in the discovery and 
phase 2 clinical trials. Competition from longer established drugs appears to not significantly affect 
attrition. The impact of alliances is not conclusive, bringing into question role of alliances on 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
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1. Background 
Product innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is costly, risky and time-consuming. With decreased 
productivity, and research and development (R&D) costs representing a high proportion of the industry 
revenues, the pharmaceutical industry is facing unprecedented challenges to its R&D model. The 
industry’s profitability and growth prospects are also under pressure as the finance of healthcare systems 
comes under increasingly intense scrutiny. 
Two of the key determinants of drug R&D activity costs are success rates and development times. Given 
the long, uncertain and multi-stage process of developing a new drug, understanding attrition rates is key 
to better understand pharmaceutical industry performance, the magnitude of the long-term investments 
involved in R&D, and improving investment activity in the future (DiMasi et al., 2003, Mestre-Ferrandiz 
et al., 2012).   
 
The multi-stage nature of the drug R&D process is characterised by the regulatory criteria established by 
policymakers to ensure safe, efficacious and accessible drugs for consumers. These regulations imply that 
the successful completion of each development stage requires different amounts of resources, diversified 
scientific knowledge, and distinct competences from firms. The stages of R&D are therefore very 
heterogeneous in duration, scope, costs and probability of success (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012). 
Despite the evident heterogeneity across the different stages, the vast majority of the literature in this area 
tends to consider the R&D process as a “black box” when evaluating the determinants of failure of 
research projects. We believe, however, that it is important to unpack the R&D process by analysing the 
key success factors of each stage of the development process in order to design more focused policies and 
incentives that foster successful R&D.  
In this article, we measure the association of the probability of failure in the different R&D phases with 
the determinants of interest – competition and alliances – by modelling the probability of failure of a 
project in each stage of the R&D process as a function of its R&D history considering the timing, 
duration and country of that stage.  
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Literature on the determinants of pharmaceutical innovation 
There are three strands of literature that relate to our article. The first strand of literature consolidates the 
following as determinants of innovation: at an aggregate level, epidemiological and income distributions 
in more dynamic economies used as proxy for market size (Acemoglu et al., 2004, Bhattacharya et al., 
2011, Lichtenberg, 2005); at the industrial level, the intensity of competition between pharmaceutical 
companies (Aharonson et al., 2007, Alexander et al., 1995, Arundel et al., 1998, Giaccotto et al., 2005, 
Grabowski et al., 2000, Mahlich et al., 2006), the presence of economies of scale and technological 
specialisation (Aharonson et al., 2007, Boasson et al., 2001, Henderson et al., 1996), and alliances 
between firms (Aharonson et al., 2007, Hirai et al., 2010); and at the firm level, the future commercial 
profitability and cash flows (Giaccotto et al., 2005, Grabowski et al., 2000, Mahlich et al., 2006, Vernon, 
2005, Vernon et al., 2009), and firm characteristics such as size (Alexander et al., 1995, Kim et al., 2009), 
age (Kim et al., 2009), location and nationality (Alexander et al., 1995, Arundel et al., 1998, Hirai et al., 
2010).  
In all this literature, the process of innovation (i.e. the R&D process) is considered a “black box” and the 
different stages of the R&D process are not assessed separately. 
A second strand of literature focuses on the measurement of success rates for the various stages of the 
R&D process using a diversity of methods and datasets (Adams et al., 2006, Adams et al., 2010, DiMasi 
et al., 2010, DiMasi et al., 2003, DiMasi et al., 1991, Gilbert et al., 2003, Kola et al., 2004, Paul et al., 
2010), with only one study providing detailed information on discovery success rates (Paul et al., 2010). 
These contributions show that drug’s success rates differ across the different stages of the R&D process 
and that the attrition rates of the clinical stages have been increasing over time. For example, the most 
comparable studies report success rates for Phase 1 to be 71% (DiMasi et al., 2003) and 65% (DiMasi et 
al., 2010); for Phase 2 to be 44% (DiMasi et al., 2003) and 40% (DiMasi et al., 2010); and for Phase 3 to 
be 69% (DiMasi et al., 2003) and 64% (DiMasi et al., 2010).  
Even though these studies provide valuable insight regarding the heterogeneity of the R&D process they 
do not address the factors associated with the success of each phase of the process. 
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The determinants of success in different stages of the R&D process are assessed by a third strand of the 
literature that accounts for the project’s history and characteristics in the analysis of phase-specific 
success rates.  
Danzon et al (2005) analyse the effect of alliances and firm experience on phase-specific probability of 
success of projects for 1,910 compounds developed by US biopharmaceutical firms between 1988 and 
2000. They find evidence of diminishing returns of firm’s experience in late stages of R&D; 
diseconomies of scale in phase 3; positive effect of alliances on the probability of success in phase 2 and 
phase 3; and evidence of knowledge spillovers across firms for phase 1. 
Kyle (2006) analyses all drugs developed in the 28 largest pharmaceutical markets between 1980 and 
2000 and finds that several of the characteristics of entrants and incumbents are positively associated with 
the time-to-entry in the G7 markets. When accounting for country-specific demand, competition appears 
to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of entry. Indeed, the impact of older drugs seems to be 
greater than that of more recently introduced drugs. Also, markets with many potential competitors 
experience more entry. 
Pammolli et al (2011) examine the association between phase-specific R&D productivity and portfolio 
composition and regional location of R&D investments using more than 28,000 compounds investigated 
since 1990. They find that lower probability of success is associated with reorientation of R&D 
investments to riskier and highly uncertain therapeutic areas. Also, no productivity gap is found between 
companies based in the United States and Europe. They also present the most recent estimates of attrition 
rates for Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 that are 25%, 52%, and 29%, respectively. 
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) uses information of all drugs that initiated the registration 
process through the US Food and Drug Administration for the first time between 1989 and 2002 to 
analyse the association of a drug’s observable characteristics (such as therapy group, route of 
administration and originator’s size) with its pathway through the three stages of clinical trials (Abrantes-
Metz, 2004). The authors find that the duration of the R&D process has decreased from 1995 to 2002; 
drugs with longer durations are less likely to succeed, as well as drugs developed by smaller firms.  
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Our article relates to these contributions in that we i) measure attrition rates in each stage of the R&D 
process and ii) analyse the characteristics associated with project failure across the different stages of the 
R&D process by estimating how phase-specific R&D attrition rates correlate with competition and 
alliances. However, our analysis departs from their analysis in two significant ways. 
First, in contrast to some earlier contributions, we use two different semi-parametric proportional models 
to estimate the impact of market structure on the phase-specific attrition rates by considering the history 
of the R&D process, and the duration of the drug projects in each phase of the process. In line with Kyle 
(2006) and Abrantes-Metz et al (2004), we believe this methodology fits more closely the dynamic and 
lengthy nature of the R&D process than the logit regression models used by Danzon et al (2005) and 
Pammolli et al (2011), which do not consider project duration as a potentially relevant part of the failure 
process. 
Secondly, we use a much richer dataset with global data from 1980 to 2012 across all therapeutic areas, 
and we analyse the influence of competition and alliances on the failures rates in each phase of the entire 
R&D process from discovery to market launch. Kyle (2006) focuses on the market conditions that affect 
the probability of launching a drug into the market whereas Abrantes-Metz et al (2004) and Pammolli et 
al (2011) assess the role of drug’s observable characteristics  (i.e., therapy category, route of 
administration) and company’s size and location on the success of transition in clinical phases (Abrantes-
Metz et al., 2004, Pammolli et al., 2011). Danzon et al (2005) focus on the role of alliances and firm 
experience (Danzon et al, 2005), on the success of clinical trials. 
We are primarily interested in modelling the association between the probability of failure of the projects 
in any R&D phase and industrial level determinants, namely competition and alliances. The nature and 
timing of competition and alliances between firms, manufacturers, scientific community, laboratories and 
academia may foster or hinder innovation. Indeed, measures of competition and alliances have been 
widely used to explain success and launch of new drugs in the market and are therefore likely to also 
influence the other stages of the R&D process. 
The role of competition 
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Though divergent in terms of data and methods, the evidence is ambiguous when assessing the effect of 
market competition on innovation. Some studies find a significant positive effect of competition on 
innovation (Aharonson et al., 2007, Alexander et al., 1995, Arundel et al., 1998, Danzon et al., 2005, 
Giaccotto et al., 2005, Grabowski et al., 2000, Mahlich et al., 2006), whereas one study reports a negative 
significant effect of market competition on innovation (Kyle, 2006). 
These contributions focus on two types of competition: i) competition in the final product market and ii) 
competition within the R&D process. Competition in the final product market is proxied by foreign sales 
(as percentage of total sales) (Arundel et al., 1998, Giaccotto et al., 2005), firms’ global market share 
(Alexander et al., 1995) and number of new drugs and old drugs in the market (Kyle, 2006). Competition 
within the R&D process is proxied by industrial margins on R&D investment per sales (Giaccotto et al., 
2005, Grabowski et al., 2000, Mahlich et al., 2006), and the number of drugs launched anywhere in the 
world in the same market. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one contribution that considers competition in the final 
product market as well as competition within the R&D process is Kyle (2006).  Kyle (2006) demonstrates 
that competition within the R&D process stimulates entry, whereas competition in the product market has 
a negative significant impact on entry. Competition from older drugs appears to a have a greater impact 
than that from more recently introduced ones. Also, markets with many potential competitors experience 
more entry. 
Following Kyle’s results on the role of competition on market launch, we hypothesize that both types of 
competition can also impact the  success of the different stages of the R&D process. 
 Our hypothesis is that if competition within the R&D process influences market entry (i.e. the transition 
from phase 3 to the market) then it is plausible to presume that it could also have a significant impact on 
the strategic decisions within the R&D process and in particular the decision to abandon a drug project. 
By testing this hypothesis we expect to identify important and significant differences of the effect of 
competition in different stages of the R&D process. In assessing the role of competition, we assume that 
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current projects in a given market take market structure as well as competitors’ strategies within the R&D 
process as given and compete simultaneously in time t.   
The role of alliances  
Though not conclusive, the literature suggests an important effect of alliances (private/public) in the drug 
R&D productivity (Aharonson et al., 2007, Danzon et al., 2005, Hirai et al., 2010). Two studies 
demonstrate significant positive effects of alliance on phase-specific R&D success rates (Danzon et al., 
2005) and drug launch times (Hirai et al., 2010), whilst a study concludes on negative effects of alliances 
with academia on R&D success rates (Aharonson et al., 2007).  
To the best of our knowledge, only the contribution of Danzon et al (2005) demonstrates a positive effect 
of alliances on phase-specific probability of success of projects, in particular they show that alliances 
have a positive effect on the probability of success in phase 2 and phase 3. Building on this literature we 
will investigate the role of alliances on the failure of R&D projects at each stage of the R&D process. We 
expect a positive effect of alliances on R&D success, which may be offset by a negative impact of some 
types of alliances, i.e. with a public institution/university as some literature suggests (Aharonson et al., 
2007).  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. In section 2 we present the specification model and 
estimation strategy. In section 3 we present description of the data. In section 4 we discuss the descriptive 
statistics and non-parametric analysis, and we present the main results from the semi-parametric analysis. 
And in section 5 we provide a discussion of the results and conclude. 
2. Specification model and estimation strategy 
We use duration models to model R&D failure and to account for the dynamic nature of sequencing drug 
R&D.  In the R&D process a project is at risk of failure at the beginning of the year and it ceases being at 
risk of failure if one of two things happens: (i) it is launched in the market (anywhere in the world); (ii) it 
is discontinued by the company. We assume that once failed the project may not be reactivated by the 
firm.  
Please do not quote without the author’s permission 
 
 8 
The probability of failure of a new drug component in the short interval of time    after  , can be 
represented  by the hazard function      (Lancaster, 1992): 
                                          
               
                       
 (1)  
The hazard function,       can be written as  
        
    
               
  
  
               
      
 (2) 
If we represent the duration distribution function as            2, where     at point in time  , 
and letting the probability density function to be           , the hazard function      at time t is 
given by: 
     
            
      
        
            
  
 
 
      
       
 
      
 
    
      
(3) 
This is the hazard rate of failure, and represents the instantaneous rate of failure per unit of time at  , 
conditional on the fact that the project has been in development up to time t. The hazard function can be 
rewritten as a function of X systematic observable characteristics of our interest:  
                (4) 
where        is a function of       and   that represents a set of relevant observable characteristics, that 
vary across calendar time. 
This enables us to model the association between attrition rates and different intensity and types of 
competition and alliances. We are interested in modelling the relationship between competition and 
alliances and the rate at which a project fails the R&D process after  , given that the project did not fail 
                                                          
2 In the context of duration models,               where      represents the survivor function.      gives the fraction of projects that stayed 
at least t years in the R&D process. It can be written in terms of an integral involving the hazard function – it equals the exponential of the 
negative integral of the hazard function between integration limits of 0 and t:                  
 
 
    . Similarly, the hazard function      
can be written in terms of a derivative involving the survivor function:        
        
    
      See T. Lancaster, 1992, pp. 6-10.  
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before. In order to do so, we model the attrition rates   
 
 from state   to state  , with    failure and 
              , where   denotes discovery,    phase 1, p2 phase 2, and p3 phase 3. 
The advantages of separately modelling the phases are that the covariates of interest may be more 
important in some phases than others, that some covariates change at the beginning of each phase, and 
that the quality of the data may differ through the different stages. For example, clinical trials conducted 
in patients must be registered in most national regulatory bodies, whereas data regarding at pre-clinical 
stages data may be somewhat self-selected by companies that choose to share information with the 
market.  
Given the supportive literature we expect a positive effect of potential market size on drug innovation, 
provided that we also control for market size. We seek to control for country-specific regulatory 
characteristics that, among others, capture systematic differences in regulatory and policy framework, and 
specificities of the technological environment. Moreover, given that the firm size is reported to have 
mixed effects on R&D productivity we also control for the type of company (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2004, 
Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012).  
We adopt two modelling strategies: (i) the single risk hazard model; and (ii) the competing risks model. 
For both of them, we use the Proportional Hazard (PH) (Van den Berg, 2001) specification as the 
estimation strategy, with the assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity (   ).  
Single risk hazard model 
In the single risk hazard model, we consider the transition to success or failure as the process of interest: 
  
                                 (5) 
where   
         is the hazard rate for failure from state  , where                 and   a set of 
relevant observable characteristics, that vary across calendar time. Also,       denotes the baseline 
hazard and      the systematic part of the hazard. 
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The hazard function is allowed to differ across projects through the systematic part     . This means that 
the population of projects is assumed to be homogeneous with respect to the systematic factors that affect 
the distribution of T.      gives the shape of the hazard function for any given project and can be 
specified as:  
                 (6) 
It is possible to consistently estimate the     in the exponential part of the model, even though the 
baseline hazard function (     ) is left unspecified. This ensures that the fitted model will always give 
estimated hazards that are non-negative. The interpretation of the coefficient of   is that it measures the 
effect on the log hazard of a unit change in the value of X at time t.  
The PH specification model allows for a non-parametric baseline hazard      . The latter is a function 
representing the duration dependence through which the probability of failure changes with the elapsed 
duration of one unit of time t.  
We are interested in estimating      , i.e. the systematic part of   
        .   
         measures the 
instantaneous rate of failure of the projects active at time   that fail in the short interval from   to     , 
in a large population of projects that are homogeneous with respect to    
The   parameters are estimated consistently by maximization of a partial likelihood function that does 
not depend on the baseline hazard function, which can be estimated non-parametrically (Lancaster, 
1992). Further detail on this can be found in Appendix A. 
Competing risks model 
Even though the single risks model provides a good baseline analysis, the nature of the R&D process is 
such that a project in a given state can either remain in that state, move on to the next state or be 
abandoned. The possibility of the project progressing to the next R&D phase impedes the occurrence of 
failure and can be considered a competing event. Progression to the next R&D phase is not considered as 
a censoring event (such as censoring due to loss to follow-up or no event at all). For example, consider a 
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project in discovery showing a progression to Phase 1 after three years. The single risk hazard model 
considers this project as being at risk of failing, even though it succeeds in progressing to the next R&D 
phase. In this model progression to Phase 1 is indistinguishable from loss of follow-up in discovery, and 
then considered censoring. In reality, though, a proportion of the projects that are considered censored in 
this first model, have progressed to another R&D phase (competing event), and therefore, should be not 
considered at risk of exiting in that specific R&D phase. The single risk hazard model described above 
fails to mirror accurately this more realistic formulation of the R&D process. To address these issues, we 
have considered as second modelling strategy, the competing risks model.  
In the competing risks model, we consider two possible, mutually exclusive, destination states for each 
R&D project: failure and progression to the subsequent R&D phase. In other words, observations are 
simultaneously exposed to several competing risks. This model imposes two assumptions. First, that 
failure is a permanent condition that prevents future progression to any next R&D phase (there is no 
resurrection). Secondly, that we do not observe regression in the R&D progress, i.e., a project cannot 
revert back from phase 3 to Phase 2 of clinical trial. This is a plausible assumption given the strong level 
of regulation in place at each R&D phase. 
Let    denote the time to the event of interest (failure)   , denote the time to the competing event 
(transition to subsequent R&D phase), and    the time to no event. Then the observed time-to-event T is 
given by                . Because we only observe one (the first) event, and so the minimum T, the 
joint distribution of            cannot be identified by the data. Therefore, the probability of failure in 
       is given by: 
                                                                                     
       (7) 
Formally, we model the transition rates   
 
            from state   to state  , with    failure and   
            , and the transition rates   
             from state   to state  , with       and   
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            , being the subsequent R&D stage after stage    The total number of projects that stay in 
the R&D pipeline at t which depart to one of the two destinations is given by: 
               
    
  (8) 
which gives us the hazard function as the sum of the transition intensities over both destination states – 
failure   and subsequent R&D phase  .  
Analogously to the single risks model, we model transition rates with the MPH specification: 
  
 
                               (9) 
  
                               (10) 
Where   stands for a set of observed project characteristics that differ across calendar time, and         
the unobserved project characteristics. Conditional on  , the variables    and    are assumed to be 
dependent only if    and    are dependent. So, in the case of independence of    and   , the model reduces 
to two unrelated ordinary PH models of    and    where the baseline transition rates        and        are 
left unspecified.  
We considered two specifications of the baseline hazard in the competing risks model: i) the first assumes 
that the baseline hazard for both types of risks (failure and progressing to next R&D phase) is identical; 
ii) the second assumes proportionality of both baseline hazards.  
The advantage of using additional information about the competing risk comes at a price, in the form of 
the assumptions needed to consistently estimate the   parameters. First, we assume that both risks are 
independent, after controlling for observed characteristics (Cameron et al., 2005). When assuming state 
independency and mutually exclusivity of the destination states, we can estimate the   parameters by 
maximising the overall (log) likelihood of the two events parts. Details about the specification of the log-
likelihood can be found in Appendix A. Secondly, we are assuming that         are project-specific 
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effects and distributed independently of the regressors (exogeneity). And finally, the effects of the 
covariates   are assumed to be proportional (Van den Berg, 2001).  
We run several specification tests after choosing which specifications were economically relevant, and 
those that minimize the Akaike’s criterion (Akaike, 1974) (See Appendix B for more details). This 
criterion statistic is commonly used to compare the quality of different models and/or models with 
different numbers of parameters by assessing the trade-off between the goodness of fit and the 
complexity of the model. We estimate the goodness-of-fit and test for the proportionality assumption
3
, 
which is a central assumption for our methodology (See Appendix B). We use the linktest that tests the 
proportionality-hazard assumption by interacting time with the covariates and verify that the effects of 
these interacted variables are not different from zero. We expect that the effects are not different from 
zero because the proportionality-hazards assumption states that the effects do not change with time 
except in ways that we already parameterized (with the semi-parametric function of the baseline hazard). 
This is the nucleus of the proportional hazard diagnostics (Hosmer et al., 2011) (See Appendix B). 
We also check for data outliers when evaluating the fit of the model. We use the method of the efficient 
score residuals to identify observations with disproportionate influence on the fit of the model and 
unusual configuration of covariates (Hosmer et al., 2011).  
3. Data and variables 
We have built a unique dataset by merging IMS Health R&D Focus of pharmaceutical projects with 
World Bank data on country level population and GDP data. We also use the Fortune ranking in 2007 and 
ScripIntelligence in 2011 to identify top100 Pharmaceutical companies (in terms of revenues and profits) 
(Fortune, July 2009, SCRIP Intelligence, 2013). 
The IMS Health R&D Focus contains information on global pharmaceutical R&D activity from 1980 
until 2012 (IMS Health, 2011). The dataset contains all pharmaceutical projects across all countries and 
                                                          
3 The proportional assumption is vital to the interpretation and use of a fitted proportional hazards model. The proportional hazards model has a 
log-hazard function of the form                          
   . It assumes that a plot of the log-hazard over time would produce two 
continuous curves, one for X=0,          , and the other for X=1,            . The difference between these two curves at any point in time 
are  , regardless of the shape of the baseline hazard function.  
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therapeutic areas with information on the starting and ending dates of each R&D stage, namely early 
discovery, phase 1, phase 2, phase 3, and market/registration (states). Therefore, the dataset contains 
information for each project for the time (in years) spent within each R&D phase (state duration), 
including the abandonment of projects by the firm (which we label failure), and the dates of transition 
between states. The dataset also records the timing of failure of a project. Using this dataset, we 
constructed time-to-event data that preserves transitions between different R&D stages, including the 
abandonment of a project, and the timing of all events.  
Each observation is a project-year, reflecting the stage of development in the R&D pipeline and the time 
spent in that stage. For each R&D stage, a project is “at risk” of failure from the year of its first entry into 
that R&D stage. If failure happens, then the project ceases being considered at risk in our analysis. Also if 
a project moves to the subsequent R&D stage, then it ceases being considered within the risk set for that 
R&D phase. 
Each drug project is assigned to one or more of the 17 broad disease areas (for example, dermatological 
conditions) and 199 more specific classes (such as anti-psoriasis treatments) using the Anatomical 
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system used by the European Pharmaceutical Market 
Research Association (European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association (EphMRA), 2013). 
Within this classification system, drugs are classified into groups at five different therapeutic levels. We 
have used the third level of the code, which indicates one from the total 262 therapeutic pharmacological 
subgroups to define the relevant market, similarly to other papers in the literature (for example Abrantes-
Metz et al., 2004, Danzon et al., 2005, Kyle, 2006).  
Projects are broadly defined to include small molecules, monoclonal antibodies, proteins, gene therapies, 
vaccines and immunotherapies, as well as fixed combination products, biosimilars, in vivo imaging 
agents, and specialized delivery systems (IMS Health, 2011). For this analysis we considered only the 
projects that do not present any biological component. Industry reports (PWC, 2011) show crucial 
differences between the R&D process of non-biologics and biologics. Also, comparison between these 
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must be cautious given the differences in sample sizes, production costs, development times and 
regulatory framework (DiMasi et al., 2007).  
Finally, some projects are first observed in the database at an R&D stage different from basic discovery. 
We accommodate this by using appropriate modelling options in our semi-parametric models to account 
for the left-censored data. 
Variables 
A complete list of variables labels and description can be found in Table 1. Our dependent variable 
captures the occurrence of a failure for each project, conditional on the R&D stage. Because we are 
separately modelling the R&D phases, four dependent variables are constructed that assign the value of 1 
if the failure happens in one of the phases                                 , and the value of zero 
to the non-occurrence of such an event (nothing happens, i.e. the project remains in the same R&D stage 
as in the previous period). 
We have considered several explanatory variables. In particular, to  proxy industrial forces, we include 
competition in the final product market, competition within the R&D process and intensity and type of 
alliances. To measure market size, we consider population and GDP per capita. Finally we have also 
included country fixed effects to control for regulatory and technological environment country-specific 
characteristics. 
To measure competition we have followed Kyle (2006) by considering competition in the final product 
market and within the R&D process. In particular, market competition for each year is measured by: (i) 
the number of new drugs, i.e. established in the market in the last five years (ii) the number of old drugs, 
i.e. established in the market for more than five years for each relevant market. Competition in the R&D 
process for each year is measured by the number of potential entrants in the same market, i.e., the number 
of projects being developed for the same market in each calendar year (potential competitors). 
To measure alliances we construct three variables to characterise the intensity and type of alliances at 
project-level. Namely we consider: (i) the log number of firms collaborating in the R&D project; (ii) the 
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participation of a big firm in the R&D project by characterising a big firm as one of the TOP100 firms 
(Big firm); and (iii) the participation of academia in the R&D process (Academia participant).  
To proxy market size one would, in principle, use disease level incidence rates. However, these are 
difficult to find across all therapeutic areas and countries for the time span considered for this analysis. 
Also, further concerns with endogeneity would arise if we include them in our analysis given the 
important role that pharmaceuticals play in reducing disease prevalence. Therefore, and following Kyle 
(2006), we have used population size and GDP per capita (GDPpc) at country level from World Bank 
data as proxies for demand. We have considered the GDP per capita (GDPpc) and population 
(Population) of the country in which the R&D process takes place. This is a plausible assumption, given 
the R&D distribution: concentrated in high-income countries (US, EU and Japan account for more than 
90% of the total projects) in all R&D phases, and the almost negligible levels of relocation of the projects 
between R&D phases (1.1% maximum of projects are relocated in our data). We also explore non-
linearity in population and GDP per capita to account for decreasing returns to scale. 
We further control for other covariates that can influence the R&D process. In particular we control for 
two relevant observable time-invariant attributes that have been used in the R&D literature that 
characterise systematic differences between the projects, namely: (i) the target therapeutic class 
(therapeutic class); and (ii) the home country for the R&D of the project (targetcountry). 
By considering systematic differences between therapeutic classes, we are allowing for different 
technological and scientific specific conditions in each therapeutic category that could influence effort 
and the probability of failure (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012). 
The country-specific characteristics capture, among others, systematic differences in regulatory and 
policy framework, and specificities of the technological environment.  
4. Results 
Descriptive statistics and nonparametric analysis 
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Our sample consists of 18,252 projects, 4,230 of which have failed. Table 2 summarises descriptive 
statistics across the years between 1980 and 2012 for failures and successes, duration of the projects, 
competition, alliances and market size proxies.  
[Table 2 in here] 
The data is consistent with the most recent estimates on attrition rates by Pammolli and colleagues 
(2011). It shows a relatively higher proportion of failure (29.9%) for projects in the preliminary stage of 
discovery than projects achieving the later stages of the process. This proportion decreases to around 14% 
in phase 1 and phase 2 of clinical trials. And, around 10% of the projects that are in phase 3 clinical trials 
fail to be launched in the market. These numbers vary over time: higher annual percentage rates of failure 
in the1980s, mainly driven by the unsuccessful experience of the non-US projects, and a declining trend 
in the late decade of 2000 (Figure 1). This may be partially due to more “births” of new projects: Figure 2 
shows relatively higher annual percentage rates of start-ups between 1980 and mid-1990s driven by the 
number of new projects in the US.  
Also, when looking across ATCs, we observe that General systemic anti-infectives (J) account for 
roughly 26.3% of the total cases of failure in the entire R&D process. Moreover, looking closely at more 
refined 3
rd
 ATC level categorisation, three ATCs concentrate the highest proportions of total failures: (i) 
antineoplastics (broad ATC: L – Antineoplastic and immonumodulating agents) account for more than 
4.6% of total R&D failures; (ii) other central nervous system drugs are due roughly 2% of total R&D 
failures (N: Nervous system); and (iii) antivirals for systemic use more than 1.8% of total R&D failures 
(J: General anti-infectives) (Table 3).  
The mean duration of failures (5.82 years in discovery, 4.78 years in phase 1, 5.52 years in phase 2 and 
5.59 years in phase 3) is more than twice the mean duration of successes (3.66, 2.22, 3.08, and 2.70 
respectively). Also, failures face on average fiercer competition than the average of successes: this is 
more pronounced when looking at the mean number of new drugs in the market and competitors in the 
R&D process. Moreover, failures experience on average lower degree of alliances in all phases of the 
R&D process except in phase 3 (1.43 against 1.69 firms in discovery, 1.43 against 2.08 firms in phase 1, 
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1.65 against 2.46 firms in phase 2 and 2.46 against 1.78 in phase 3). The participation of a big firm and 
academia is relatively higher in failures in early stages of development, when comparing to the successes. 
The population and GDP per capita of countries with more failures are on average higher than those with 
more successes.  
We run log-rank tests to test for the differences in the relative survival experiences of distinct groups that 
can be constructed by looking at different levels of each covariate. The logrank test statistic compares 
estimates of the hazard functions of these different groups at each observed event time. For instance, it 
compares the true hazard function of projects facing no market competition with the true hazard function 
of projects facing competition at some level (for example, 1 competitor). Our results suggest that we can 
reject the null hypothesis that assumes no difference between the true survivor functions for the different 
groups of drug projects that face different intensities of competition, and intensities and types of 
alliances. 
Results from the non-parametric analysis support many of the descriptive statistics results and anticipate 
our conclusions. The several Kaplan-Meier (KM) survivor functions show survival estimates of projects 
that face different levels of competition and experience different levels of alliances, across the R&D 
phases
4
.  
The KM estimates suggest that projects facing higher levels of market competition fail more quickly in 
the discovery and Phase 1 stages when competing with more new or drugs longer established in the 
market (Figure 3). Also, projects tend to fail less in the discovery stage when facing more competition 
within the R&D process (Figure 4). Things get less clear when looking at the other R&D stages. 
The survivor functions of all R&D phases are clearly inconclusive when depicting the survival 
experience of projects with different intensities and types of alliances. Projects with more than two 
collaborators fail more quickly but not as quick as the projects that are developed solely by one company 
or by a large number of collaborators (Figure 5). Moreover, projects in late stages of clinical trials survive 
                                                          
4 All graphs are available from the authors upon request. 
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more when involving the alliances of at least one big company (Figure 6). Also, academic partners seem 
to linked to more successful projects in pre-clinical stages of development.  
These data and results form the basis for the semi-parametric analysis that follows. 
Semi-parametric analysis  
According to the efficient score residuals analysis criterion, we identify 17 drug projects from a total of 
18,270 projects, with disproportionate influence on the fit of the model. These 17 drug projects 
correspond to 11 antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents, four drugs targeting the nervous system, 
one project relating to anti-infectives and one for the musculoskeletal system. These correspond to 235 
project-year observations from the total number of 102,935 project-year observations. We have excluded 
these from our analysis. However we have run the analysis without excluding these observations and 
results do not change qualitatively when incorporating the omitted observations
5
.  
We run several specifications allowing for all possible combinations of time-invariant and time-varying 
characteristics. The results for the remaining specifications remain qualitatively the same and are 
available from the authors upon request. All models include year dummies and three levels of covariates 
we are interested in exploring: (i) competition proxies (final product market competition from new and 
old drugs and competition within the R&D process from potential competitors); (ii) alliances (log of the 
number of firms collaborating, Big firm, and academia); and market size (proxied by population and 
GDPpc, and nonlinearities of both). 
We discuss the results of a specification model that introduces an interaction term between the log 
number of firms and the presence of a big firm in the alliance, controlling for year and therapeutic level 
fixed effects. This model does not fail the linktest
6
 and respects the proportionality assumption. The 
results for the remaining specifications remain qualitatively the same and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
                                                          
5 These results are available from authors upon request. 
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Table 4 reports estimation results of single risk hazard model for all R&D phases, whilst Table 5 shows 
estimation results of the competing risks model. Two specifications of the baseline hazard are considered 
in the competing risks model: the first assumes that the baseline hazard for both types of risks is identical; 
the second assumes proportionality of both baseline hazards. The results are robust across both 
specifications of the baseline hazard. The results are robust across the different models of the baseline 
hazard considered (presented in Section 2). However for presentation purposes we present the results of 
the second specification of the hazard. 
The results refer to the reference case country USA, year 1990, and therapeutic category Sensory organs. 
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
Competition 
The results of the single risk model (Table 4) show that more competition from new drugs established in 
the market is associated with a significantly higher risk of failure of projects before they reach phase 3 of 
clinical trials. This result is robust across all specifications except in two cases: when omitting the 
number of old incumbents or the number of potential entrants. The effect seems to weaken when the 
project reaches phase3 of clinical trials. The results of the competing risks model are analogous to these; 
however they are only statistically significant in the discovery stage. This seems to suggest that pressure 
from young incumbents is not significantly different in influencing failure or success after the project 
passes the discovery stage. 
Experiencing competition from drugs that have been longer established in the market (old drugs) seems 
not to be connected with the risk of failure of projects across the R&D process. This is a robust result 
across single and competing risks model in all specifications.  
Exposure to more potential entrants in the market (competition within the R&D process) is associated 
with lower risk of failure of drug projects in discovery and phase 1 of clinical trials. This result is robust 
to model specifications and both modelling strategies. The same result is also found for phase 2 but only 
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for the single risks model. Competition within the R&D process is not significantly associated with 
failure or success in late stages of development. 
 
Alliances 
We have found weak evidence of a link between level of alliances and drug R&D failure. Our results 
demonstrate that increasing the number of collaborators in the R&D process is associated with lower risk 
of failure in Phase 2 in the single risks model. Still in the single risks model there is some analogous 
evidence for discovery, Phases 1 though not significant across all specifications. In the competing risks 
model, however the significance is not robust across all specifications. 
This result is in line with the findings from the literature that report ambiguous results regarding the role 
of alliances on R&D productivity (Aharonson et al., 2007, Danzon et al., 2005, Hirai et al., 2010). In 
particular, Danzon et al (2004) find the greater the number of firms collaborating in the project the higher 
the probability of success of the projects only in Phases 2 and 3.  
Ambiguous effects are found when considering the type of alliances. In the single risks model, alliances 
with a big firm is related to higher risk of failure in discovery but lower risk of failure in Phase 3 clinical 
trials. However in the competing risks model, alliances with a big firm decreases the risk of failure in 
both phases. 
Finally the introduction of the interaction term between the log number of firms and the dummy that 
captures participation of a big firm reveals a nonlinear effect of alliances in decreasing the risk of failure 
in phase 2. 
With respect to alliances with academia, in both the single and competing risk models, research 
partnerships with academia involve higher risk of failure in discovery, and lower risk of failure in phase 3 
for the single risks model. 
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Market size 
When looking at the effect of market size in the likelihood of failure, results are qualitatively similar in 
both modelling strategies. However, and as in Kyle (2006), neither population nor GDP per capita are 
significantly associated with failure. The market size of the home country of the project is significantly 
associated with its likelihood of failure.  
However, when including a non-linear effect of population, by introducing population squared to the 
specification model, the results show significantly lower risk of failure in discovery stage in more 
populated countries.  
The results also show some non-linearity when introducing GDP per capita (GDP per capita square) as a 
proxy for affordability at country level. This is more evident when controlling for country-specific fixed 
effects. Projects being developed in richer countries present a higher risk of failure in discovery stage 
than projects developed in poorer countries. This is indicated by the negative coefficient of GDP per 
capita squared. These results confirm evidence from the existing literature in this field (Acemoglu et al., 
2004, Allison, 1984, Bhattacharya et al., 2011, Civan et al., 2006, Dubois et al., 2011, Lichtenberg, 
2005).  
Additionally, these results are in line with the regional innovation paradox referred to in the innovation 
and economic growth literature: there seems to be an apparent contradiction between the comparatively 
greater need to spend on innovation in poor regions and their relatively lower capacity to invest in 
innovation related activities, compared to more advanced regions (Barro et al., 1992, Nelson, 1996, 
Oughton et al., 2002). 
These results may be capturing two effects: the relevance of the US on the worldwide R&D activity, and 
the saturation of the market in higher income countries. The first is related to the disproportionate 
proportion of projects started and failed in the US. The second effect may be related to the fact that 
rewards to R&D investment are likely to be higher in richer countries, so it may be more worthwhile 
taking the risk of investment in richer rather than in poorer countries. 
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As a final remark, our results suggest significant effect of competition and alliances on the rate of failure 
in two particular phases: discovery and phase 2. These appear to be two crucial stages of development 
where there are systematic differences between failure and progression to next R&D phase, as also shown 
by the competing risks model.  
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This article seeks to measure the association of competition and alliances with the probability of failure in 
the different R&D phases using semi-parametric duration models to model global R&D data. 
Three important results emerge from our analysis. The first is that the determinants of failure differ across 
the different phases of the R&D process. In particular the advocated role of competition and alliances as 
platforms for successful innovation is not verified across all stages of the research process. 
Secondly we show competition to be significantly associated with failure in discovery and Phase 2 in two 
ways. First, we find that the probability of failure of a project declines in the number of potential 
competitors (competition within the R&D). This may be due to the fact that the number of projects in a 
therapeutic area signals a therapeutic group where there is potential for incremental innovation, or 
unaddressed health needs and scientific challenges that motivate further R&D investment. Also, this 
effect may be suggesting the positive pressure to become the first to get patented and launch in the 
market to recoup the investment in R&D. Secondly, we find that the risk of failure increases in the 
number of new drugs in the market (market competition). Our result is specific to Phase 2 clinical trials. 
If prospect profitability signalled by the number of competitors in the market is low then it seems natural 
that firms are keener in abandoning the projects if phase 2 clinical trials reveal that the drugs don’t offer a 
substantial advancement when benchmarked in terms of incremental effectiveness with drugs that have 
been more recently adopted.  
Even though novel, both findings seem to be aligned with Kyle’s results that, focusing only on market 
launch, shows that drugs with more potential competitors are more likely to experience entry; on the 
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other hand, competition from new incumbents reduces the probability of launching a new drug in the 
market (Kyle, 2006).  
In our analysis competition does not play any role in project abandonment in Phase 3 clinical trials, but it 
is associated with failure in discovery and Phase 2. These two stages indicate two important milestones 
for the R&D process. Failing to successfully complete the discovery stage means that the drug does not 
satisfactorily pass the “first toxicity dose” levels required to support administration to a human. This is 
largely a scientific issue. On the other hand, Phase II trials are increasingly a large financial commitment. 
Indeed given the increased regulatory requirements in phase 3 trials, firms have increasingly expanded 
the number of subjects in phase 2 trials in order to predict at an earlier stage whether it is commercially 
viable to proceed to phase 3 (Scannell et al., 2012). Failing to complete Phase 2 trials can reveal at an 
earlier stage not only the lack of drug efficacy, particularly for therapeutic areas with animal models of 
efficacy that are hardly predictive such as oncology (Kola et al., 2004), but also, insufficient commercial 
differentiation from existing drugs in the market (Arrowsmith et al., 2013). Since progressing to phase 3 
implies an important financial commitment associated with large-scale clinical safety and efficacy studies 
required for the “launch decision” (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2012) phase 2 trials can be strategically used 
to unveil important information regarding the success of phase 3 trials . 
The third result suggests a mixed association between alliances and the probability of failure of projects, 
confirming the ambiguous findings of the literature (Aharonson et al., 2007, Danzon et al., 2005, Hirai et 
al., 2010).  
At first sight our results suggest that the qualitative effect of the number of collaborators on failure seems 
to change across the different specifications and the different phases of the R&D process. However, 
controlling for the firm size, a closer analysis clearly shows that in Phases 2 and 3: (i) the risk of failure 
decreases in the number of collaborators; (ii) the participation of at least one big firm company in the 
research project is associated with lower rate of failure of drug projects, particularly in the transition from 
phase 3 clinical trials to market launch; and (iii) that this participation presents decreasing returns when 
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extending the alliances protocol to a greater number of participants, provided that we interact the log 
number of alliances with the participation of a big firm.  
These findings are more evident in the scaling up of clinical trials (phase 3). At this stage of the R&D 
process innovators must not only focus on product development and clinical trials but also on a series of 
functional activities that ultimately lead to a successful launch, including: scaling up manufacturing; 
logistics and distribution processes; marketing effort; regulatory compliance among others. The transition 
to the market is therefore more likely to be successful with the alliances with big firms that have 
established these capabilities over a long period of time. This result is consistent with findings reported in 
the literature (Abrantes-Metz et al, 2004; Mestre-Ferrandiz et al, 2012). 
When looking at the partnerships with academia, we find that alliances with academia are associated with 
increased risk of failure of projects in discovery. This may be due the fact that academia is normally 
engaged in exploratory research of riskier targets and consequently harder to innovate, or even not 
commercially appealing. For example there is evidence of academia being involved in various case 
studies on the potential role of genomics in fostering drug discovery in many tropical diseases (Gardner 
et al., 2002, Ridley et al., 2006, Rosamond et al., 2000). Other possible reasons may be linked to the 
documented divergences of perspectives and interests of academia and industry researchers that hinder 
successful collaborative effort (Siegel et al., 2003). This divergences lead to a trade-off between 
disclosure and secrecy of knowledge in the current structure of patenting in the drug discovery (Rhoten et 
al., 2007), and unveil the conflicting objectives, work environments and scientific methodologies of both 
parties (Munos et al., 2009, Murray et al., 2007, Perkmann et al., 2007). 
The change in signs across R&D phases when evaluating the role of alliances on failure could be related 
to the nature of the alliance that is not captured in our models. There might be attributes of the alliances 
not available in our data that may be masking important characteristics of the projects and/or nature and 
process of the alliances that can contribute to the likelihood of the failure of the R&D project. 
There are several caveats of our analysis driven by the quality of our data and the lack of detailed data at 
firm level and project level. First, there is a potential problem for selection bias: projects that fail may be 
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systematically different in nature from the ones that succeed, which means that unobserved 
characteristics of the drug projects may be correlated with the level and intensity of competition, alliances 
or even market size. Secondly, we are not modelling failure as a function of strategic behaviour of the 
firm and its competitors. Such analysis would require firm and project level data that is unavailable in our 
dataset. In particular, in our data, the majority of the projects are owned by several companies and we 
cannot identify and measure the role and effort of each firm in the R&D process. This fact restricts the 
use of firm-level fixed effects as a means to incorporate the strategic behaviour of the firms in our 
analysis. 
Finally, projects may clearly fail to complete a specific R&D phase due to several reasons. Failure may 
be a combination of rejection by the regulatory bodies; withdrawal by the firm; merger and/or acquisition 
by a competitor; or even scientific/clinical non-achievement. With our data cannot separately identify the 
reasons behind project abandonment.  
Addressing these caveats requires data at firm and project level to be more readily available for research. 
Many of these issues would be potentially solved with more information about pharmaceutical 
companies, such as their financial accounts, their patenting and licensing activities, and the clinical and 
financial risk of their R&D portfolio. This information is not available which restricts our analysis. 
Despite these caveats we retain our analysis as a novel and relevant insight into the nature of the R&D 
process. This piece of work may contribute to the policy debate on the presumed role of competition and 
alliances as platforms for successful innovation.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
 Variable Definition Frequency 
Competition and alliances: 
Supply-side forces (S) 
Competition in the final product 
market – new drugs 
Number of new drugs in the market in 
the same market 
Count of drugs in market 
launched less than 5 years ago 
Therapeutic class-
year 
Competition in the final product 
market – old drugs 
Number of old drugs in the market in 
the same market 
Count of drugs in market 
launched more than 5 years ago 
Therapeutic class-
year 
Competition within the R&D 
process –potential competitors 
Number of potential competitors within 
R&D process in the same market 
Count of R&D projects in the 
same market 
Therapeutic class-
year 
Intensity of alliances - number 
firms collaborating in the project 
Level of alliances Log of total number of 
collaborators 
Therapeutic class-
year 
Type of alliances - Big firm 
participant 
TOP100 firm participant Project has at least one TOP100 
firm collaborator (dummy 
variable) 
Drug project 
Type of alliances - Academia 
participant 
academia participant Project has at least one academia 
collaborator (dummy variable) 
Drug project 
Market size: 
Demand-side forces (S) 
Population, total Population Population in 10s of millions Country 
GDP pc (constant 2000 US$) GDP per capita GDP per capita in US$1000s Country 
Regulatory forces (P) Targetcountry Targetcountry Country where R&D is based R&D phase-year 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics - Sample means across 1980-2012 
Variables Discovery Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
  Total Failures Successes Total Failures Successes Total Failures Successes Total Failures Successes 
             
Duration 3.48 5.82 3.66 2.48 4.78 2.22 2.70 5.52 3.08 2.24 5.59 2.70 
Competition in the final 
product market – new drugs 
6.06 13.61 8.04 7.21 18.28 10.18 6.69 17.72 10.37 7.59 21.91 7.65 
Competition in the final 
product market – old drugs 
0.88 2.00 1.21 0.95 2.22 1.28 1.02 1.86 1.34 1.07 2.07 1.00 
Competition within the R&D 
process –potential competitors 
11.02 22.79 14.21 13.08 30.67 17.98 12.37 30.60 18.37 13.70 39.42 13.78 
Population, total 1.7E+09 2.0E+09 1.8E+09 1.7E+09 1.9E+09 1.8E+09 1.7E+09 1.9E+09 1.8E+09 1.9E+09 2.3E+09 1.8E+09 
GDP pc (constant 2000 US$) 29058.08 31988.49 30052.19 29882.39 32233.52 30570.54 30734.38 32398.69 31483.51 30503.2 32320.02 30037.68 
Intensity of alliances 1.65 1.43 1.69 2.05 1.43 2.08 2.24 1.65 2.46 2.87 2.46 1.78 
Type of alliances - big firm 
participant 
0.59 0.56 0.54 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.53 
Type of alliances - Academia 
participant 
0.12 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.12 
             
Number of observations 54600     11109     9644    5789     
Number of drug projects 10952 3277  3257 444  2446 361  1597 148  
Proportion of failed projects  29.90%   13.60%   14.80%   9%  
Number of therapeutic classes 78            
Years covered 1980-2012                     
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Figure 1: Annual percentage rate of failure of drug projects 
 
Figure 2: Annual percentage rate of start-ups of drug projects 
 
 
 
Table 3: Distribution of R&D activity and failure by therapeutic category  
 
 
Total (failure+success) 
number of R&D projects 
Proportion of failed drugs 
as a proportion of total 
failures in each ATC 
Proportion of failed 
drugs as a proportion of 
total failures 
 
Total number of projects: 18,252 
    
Failed projects: 4,230 
   A: Alimentary tract and metabolism 
1583 
 
0.203 
 stomatologicals, mouth preparations, medicinal  
dentifrices etc 44 0.250 0.0006 
 
drugs used in diabetes 645 0.203 0.0072 
 
vitamins 5 0.000 0.0000 
 
anabolics, systemic 3 0.000 0.0000 
 
appetite stimulants 7 0.143 0.0001 
 
other alimentary tract and metabolism products 124 0.129 0.0009 
 
antacids, antiflatulents and anti-ulcerants 128 0.203 0.0014 
 
functional gastro-intestinal disorder drugs 133 0.128 0.0009 
0
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antiemetics and antinauseants 66 0.167 0.0006 
 
cholagogues and hepatic protectors 48 0.146 0.0004 
 
laxatives 7 0.143 0.0001 
 antidiarrhoeals, oral electrolyte replacers and 
intestinal anti -inflammatories 187 0.156 0.0016 
 
antiobesity preparations, excluding dietetics 181 0.387 0.0038 
 
digestives, including digestive enzymes 5 0.200 0.0001 
B: Blood and Blood forming organs 
653 
 
0.247 
 
antithrombotic agents 402 0.279 0.0061 
 
blood coagulation system, other products 113 0.230 0.0014 
 
anti-anaemic preparations 98 0.143 0.0008 
 
all other haematological agents 40 0.225 0.0005 
C: Cardiovascular system 
1767 
 
0.239 
 
cardiac therapy 538 0.251 0.0074 
 
lipid-regulating/anti-atheroma preparations 302 0.265 0.0044 
 cardiovascular multitherapy combination 
products 3 0.334 0.0001 
 
antihypertensives 151 0.212 0.0018 
 
diuretics 40 0.300 0.0007 
 
cerebral and peripheral vasotherapeutics 141 0.234 0.0018 
 
antivaricosis/anti-haemorrhoidal preparations 3 0.000 0.0000 
 
other cardiovascular products 208 0.274 0.0031 
 
beta-blocking agents 44 0.114 0.0003 
 
calcium antagonists 137 0.182 0.0014 
 
agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system 200 0.210 0.0023 
D: Dermatologicals 
631 
 
0.170 
 
antifungals, dermatological 39 0.051 0.0001 
 
anti-acne preparations 65 0.138 0.0005 
 
other dermatological preparations 132 0.227 16437.0000 
 
wound healing agents 110 0.164 0.0010 
 anti-pruritics, including topical antihistamines, 
anaesthetics, etc 21 0.190 0.0002 
 nonsteroidal products for inflammatory skin 
disorders 188 0.170 0.0018 
 
topical antibacterials and antivirals 57 0.140 0.0004 
 
topical corticosteroids 19 0.263 0.0003 
G: Genitourinary system and sex hormones 
668 
 
0.166 
 
gynaecological anti-infectives 11 0.182 0.0001 
 
other gynaecologicals 106 0.189 0.0011 
 sex hormones and products with similar desired 
effects, systemic action only 198 0.217 0.0024 
 
urologicals 353 0.133 0.0026 
H: Systemic hormonal preparations (excluding sex 
hormones) 142 
 
0.169 
 
pituitary and hypothalamic hormones 32 0.125 0.0002 
 
systemic corticosteroids 6 0.000 0.0000 
 
thyroid therapy 5 0.200 0.0001 
 
other hormones 99 0.192 0.0010 
J: General anti-infectives (systemic) 
2626 
 
0.263 
 
systemic antibacterials 795 0.258 0.0112 
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systemic agents for fungal infections 181 0.309 0.0031 
 
antimycobacterials 27 0.223 0.0003 
 
antivirals for systemic use 1080 0.306 0.0181 
 
sera and gamma-globulin 56 0.161 0.0005 
 
vaccines 379 0.071 0.0015 
 
other anti-infectives 108 0.528 0.0031 
L: Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 
4578 
 
0.236 
 
antineoplastics 3484 0.243 0.0463 
 
cytostatic hormone therapy 137 0.212 0.0016 
 
immunostimulating agents 359 0.120 0.0024 
 
immunosuppressants 598 0.269 0.0088 
M: Musculoskeletal system 
970 
 
0.252 
 
anti-inflammatory and anti-rheumatic products 600 0.272 0.0089 
 
topical anti-rheumatics 19 0.000 0.0000 
 
muscle relaxants 37 0.162 0.0003 
 
anti-gout preparations 33 0.030 0.0001 
 other drugs for disorders of the musculo-skeletal 
system 281 0.263 0.0041 
N: Nervous system 
3184 
 
0.250 
 
anaesthetics 48 0.210 0.0005 
 
analgesics 557 0.260 0.0079 
 
anti-epileptics 158 0.190 0.0016 
 
anti-parkinson drugs 166 0.188 0.0017 
 
psycholeptics 520 0.250 0.0071 
 psychoanaleptics excluding anti-obesity 
preparations 434 0.182 0.0043 
 
other cns drugs 1301 0.284 0.0202 
P: Parasitology 
143 
 
0.217 
 
antiprotozoals and anthelmintics 141 0.220 0.0017 
 ectoparasiticides, including scabicides, 
insecticides and repellents 2 0.000 0.0000 
R: Respiratory system 
928 
 
0.209 
 
nasal preparations 87 0.080 0.0004 
 
anti-asthma and copd products 575 0.206 0.0065 
 
cough and cold preparations 23 0.174 0.0002 
 
systemic antihistamines 73 0.233 0.0009 
 
other respiratory system products 170 0.282 0.0026 
S: Sensory organs 
379 
 
0.135 
 
ophthalmologicals 362 0.141 0.0028 
 
otologicals 17 0.000 0.0000 
Source: Authors analysis using IMS R&D Focus, 1980-2012 
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Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survival functions: competition in the final product market – New drugs 
 
Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier survival functions: competition within the R&D process 
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier survival functions: intensity of alliances 
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Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier survival functions: type of alliances – top100 firm 
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Parameter estimation results: single risks model 
Table 4: Market structure characteristics: Single risk (Sub-hazard rates) 
 Discovery-to-Phase1 Phase1-to-Phase2 Phase2-to-Phase3 Phase3-to-Market 
Competition in the final product market 
– new drugs 
1.008*** 1.012** 1.018*** 1.005 
 (0.00152) (0.00497) (0.00570) (0.00796) 
     
Competition in the final product market 
– old drugs 
1.000 0.999 0.999 1.006 
 (0.00201) (0.00617) (0.00716) (0.00818) 
     
Competition within the R&D process –
potential competitors 
0.996*** 0.994** 0.990*** 0.998 
 (0.000841) (0.00276) (0.00312) (0.00449) 
     
Population, total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (3.71e-10) (1.05e-09) (1.17e-09) (1.83e-09) 
     
GDP pc (constant 2000 US$) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.0000222) (0.0000654) (0.0000407) (0.0000726) 
     
GDP pc squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (3.83e-10) (1.15e-09) (7.83e-10) (1.34e-09) 
     
Intensity of alliances - number firms 
collaborating in the project 
1.041 0.965 0.471*** 0.851 
 (0.0841) (0.248) (0.110) (0.318) 
     
Type of alliances - big firm participant 1.282*** 1.107 0.871 0.457*** 
 (0.0583) (0.147) (0.139) (0.131) 
     
Type of alliances - Academia 
participant 
1.160** 0.928 0.977 0.465* 
 (0.0781) (0.207) (0.255) (0.215) 
     
1.Big firm#c.lnrfirms 0.807** 0.718 1.370 1.577 
 (0.0743) (0.198) (0.381) (0.679) 
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Population squared 1 1 1 1 
 (4.55e-19) (1.19e-18) (1.36e-18) (1.61e-18) 
Fixed effects     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Therapeutic area Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Targetcountry     
Observations 41502 6990 5995 2817 
#Projects 7811 1932 1437 857 
#Failures 2856 344 276 102 
Log lik. -20917.4 -1965.3 -1534.7 -480.0 
Akaike's_criterion 41914.8 4014.6 3167.4 1018.0 
(Goodness-of-fit)  0.344 0.769 0.134 0.986 
Proportionality assumption 0.6726 0.4404 1.00 0.0940 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Parameter estimation results: competing risks model 
We considered two specifications of the baseline hazard in the competing risks model: the first assumes that the baseline hazard for both types of risks (failure 
and progressing to next R&D phase) is identical (1b.type); the second assumes proportionality of both baseline hazards (2.type). The results are robust across 
the different models of the baseline hazard considered. We present the results of the second specification of the hazard. 
Table 5: Market structure characteristics: Competing risks (Sub-hazard rates) 
Model 5 Discovery-to-Phase1 Phase1-to-Phase2 Phase2-to-Phase3 Phase3-to-Market 
     
Competition in the final product 
market – new drugs 
1.004*** 1.005** 1.005 1.001 
 (0.000976) (0.00217) (0.00277) (0.00750) 
     
Competition in the final product 
market – old drugs 
1.000 1.001 1.002 1.001 
 (0.00133) (0.00270) (0.00398) (0.00766) 
     
Competition within the R&D 
process –potential competitors 
0.998*** 0.997** 0.998 0.999 
 (0.000533) (0.00115) (0.00153) (0.00432) 
     
Population, total 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (2.14e-10) (3.67e-10) (4.81e-10) (1.71e-09) 
     
GDP pc (constant 2000 US$) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.00000970) (0.0000173) (0.0000182) (0.0000763) 
     
GDP pc squared 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (1.75e-10) (3.25e-10) (3.42e-10) (1.38e-09) 
     
Intensity of alliances - number 
firms collaborating in the project 
0.949 1.120 0.826* 0.858 
 (0.0436) (0.106) (0.0887) (0.290) 
     
Type of alliances - big firm 0.912*** 0.948 0.995 0.610* 
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participant 
 (0.0255) (0.0511) (0.0742) (0.173) 
     
Type of alliances - Academia 
participant 
1.132*** 0.896 1.031 0.946 
 (0.0403) (0.0758) (0.0975) (0.367) 
     
type==2 3.78e-11 5.22e-23 4.97e-14 6.69e-21 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
1.Big firm #c.lnrfirms 1.162*** 1.063 1.454*** 1.389 
 (0.0662) (0.110) (0.174) (0.524) 
     
Population squared 1 1 1 1 
 (2.45e-19) (3.59e-19) (5.45e-19) (1.57e-18) 
Observations 87788 14925 12865 5627 
#Projects 9129 2390 1856 1125 
#Failures 7314 1741 1197 117 
Log lik. -57104.0 -11466.6 -7456.9 -553.4 
Akaike's_criterion 114303.9 23035.3 15007.8 1188.9 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Work in progress: Please do not quote without the author’s permission 
 
 43 
APPENDIX A 
Estimation strategies 
 
Partial likelihood  
In the context of Cox’ proportional hazard model, we can estimate the relationship between the hazard 
rate and explanatory variables without having to make any assumptions about the shape of the baseline 
hazard function. This is called a semi-parametric model. When recalling single risks model specification 
in [7]: 
  
                   
                [A1] 
And using proportional hazard assumption together with other assumptions, it is possible to estimate 
consistently   using partial likelihood method of estimation, rather than maximum likelihood. Partial 
likelihood is used when there is no full information on the form for the joint data distribution(Allison, 
1984) 
. What differs from maximum likelihood is that instead of individuals or projects, we are interested to 
model the occurrence of ordered (according to duration time) events  . 
We are interested to model the probability distribution of the duration of abandoned projects T, for any 
particular drug project and regard ti as a realisation of the random variable Ti for a project with 
characteristics of each drug project in the sample (Lancaster, 1992). 
The sample Partial Likelihood is given by: 
      
 
    [A2] 
  =P(project d has event at t=ti conditional on being in the risk set at t=ti) = P(this particular project d 
experiences the event at t=ti, given that one project amongst many at risk experiences the event)  
To work out this probability, we need to use the rules of conditional probability together with the fact that 
             , and so the probability that an event occurs in the tiny interval [t, t+  ) is        
          . Considering the illustrative dataset in the following table: 
Drug project #d Duration Td Event #i 
1 2 1 
2 4 2 
3 9 (no event – censored) 
4 11 3 
5 13 4 
6 14 (no event – censored) 
 
Consider the event i=4 with risk set        . We can define 
   P(event experienced by d=5 and not d=6) =                          [A3] 
   P(event experienced by d=6 and not d=5) =                          [A4] 
The probability of either A or B using the standard conditional probability formula is equal to 
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   [A5] 
The survivor function terms cancel out. With this, we can derive all the other   . For example, 
   
     
                  
   [A6] 
All projects are in the risk set for the first event. Now let us apply PH model specification, and we have: 
   
      
             
 
         
                   
 
   
       
   [A7] 
The baseline hazard contributions cancel out. Similarly, 
   
   
             
   [A8] 
And so on for all events. Given each    expression, we can construct the complete PL expression for the 
whole sample of events, and then maximise it to derive  . As said before, the baseline hazard function is 
completely unspecified (Jenkins, 2005, Lancaster, 1992). Also, to note that each    expression does not 
depend on the precise survival time at which the     event occurs, but only the order of events affects the 
PL expression. 
We also highlight the fact that the PH assumption implies that the hazard function for two different 
projects has the same shape, differing only by a constant multiplicative scaling factor that does not vary 
with survival time. This assumption may be tested. 
Moreover, just to remember that we incorporate time-varying covariates. PL estimates use the 
information at each event time. This means that covariates are only “evaluated” during the estimation at 
event times, and so it does not matter what happens to their values in between. 
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Log-likelihood 
In the case of competing risks model, when we consider two possible destination (risk), the overall model 
likelihood value is the sum of the likelihood values for each of the destination-specific models, 
  
        
 , recalling [10] and [11]. The log-likelihood for the whole sample is the sum of this expression 
over all individual records in the sample. 
 
The log-likelihood is given by  
              
 
            
       
              [A9] 
 
Two main assumptions are taken to use this estimation method. (Lancaster, 1992) 
Assumption 1: State independency - the chances of making transition from the current state do not 
depend on transition history prior to entry to the current state. 
To estimate destination-specific hazard rates, there is a weak identification assumption to hold: risks 
independence. This implies that:  
 
                  or even                        [A10] 
 
That is,          
 
           
          i.e. the hazard rate for transition to any destination is the sum 
of the destination-specific hazard rates, controlling for   observables. Once failure occurs, the failure to 
destination j has probability  
  
    
  
    
 . 
Independence also means that the survivor function for transition to any destinations can be factored into 
a product of destination-specific functions: 
                 
 
 
           
       
       
 
 
  
         
       
 
 
           
       
 
 
              [A11] 
 
 
Assumption 2: Destinations are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possible destinations 
The individual sample likelihood contribution in the independent competing risk model with two 
destinations is of three types: 
 
                                        [A12] 
 
                                        [A13] 
 
                                            [A14] 
 
  , the likelihood contribution summarises the chances of a transition to j combined with no transition to 
k, and vice versa in the     case. The destination-specific censoring indicators: 
    
                    
                                          
  [A15] 
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  [A16] 
 
The overall contribution from the individual to the likelihood,  , is 
      
 
    
  
       
                  
  
            
  
            
       
 
  
     
     
 
  
      
     
     
 
  
           
  
         
              
  
           
         [x] 
 
              
 
            
       
              [A17] 
 
We can maximise the overall (log) likelihood by maximising the two component parts separately. The 
overall model likelihood value is the sum of the likelihood values for each of the destination-specific 
models. The log-likelihood for the whole sample is the sum of this expression over all projects in the 
sample. 
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APPENDIX B 
Akaike’s criteria 
Akaike’s (AIC) criteria: for each model specification the value is computed as: AIC= 2 
 log likelihood  2 p   s , where p denotes the number of covariates in the model and s=1 for 
the Weibull and log-logistic models (Akaike, 1974). (Akaike, 1974, Hosmer et al., 2011) 
 
 
Testing goodness-of-fit and proportionality assumption 
As a specification test and a measure of goodness-of-fit, we use the link test which basically regresses 
on and, where now the original model regressors are omitted. It tests whether the coefficient of is zero 
under the null hypothesis. (Cleves et al., 2010, Hosmer et al., 2011) 
We use the link test to interact a function of time on time-varying variables and test whether their 
coefficients are zero under the null hypothesis. (Hosmer et al., 2011) We carry out the log-rank test 
that assumes under the null hypothesis that the different group’s hazards functions are similar, where 
the groups are defined by the different level of covariate x. (Cleves et al., 2010)  
The preferred method of performing this analysis is to compare the estimated parameter   
x
 obtained 
from the full data with the estimated parameters   
i
x
 obtained by fitting the model to the n   
observations remaining after the ith observation is removed. If   
x
-  
i
x
 is close to zero, then the ith 
observation has little influence on the estimate (Cleves et al., 2010). 
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